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Abstrat. AVISPA is a push-button tool for the automated validation
of Internet seurity-sensitive protools and appliations. It provides a
modular and expressive formal language for speifying protools and
their seurity properties, and integrates dierent bak-ends that imple-
ment a variety of state-of-the-art automati analysis tehniques. To the
best of our knowledge, no other tool exhibits the same level of sope and
robustness while enjoying the same performane and salability.
1 Introdution
With the spread of the Internet and network-based servies, the number and sale
of new seurity protools under development is out-paing the human ability to
rigorously analyze and validate them. To speed up the development of the next
generation of seurity protools, and to improve their seurity, it is of utmost
importane to have tools that support the rigorous analysis of seurity proto-
ols by either nding aws or establishing their orretness. Optimally, these
tools should be ompletely automated, robust, expressive, and easily usable, so
that they an be integrated into the protool development and standardization
proesses to improve the speed and quality of these proesses.
A number of (semi-)automated protool analysis tools have been proposed,
e.g. [1, 4, 6, 7, 13, 14℄, whih an analyze small and medium-sale protools suh as
those in the Clark/Jaob library [10℄. However, saling up to large sale Internet
seurity protools is a onsiderable hallenge, both sienti and tehnologial.
We have developed a push-button tool for the Automated V alidation of Internet
?
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Seurity-sensitive Protools and Appliations, the AVISPA Tool
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, whih rises
to this hallenge in a systemati way by (i) providing a modular and expres-
sive formal language for speifying seurity protools and properties, and (ii)
integrating dierent bak-ends that implement a variety of automati analysis
tehniques ranging from protool falsiation (by nding an attak on the input
protool) to abstration-based veriation methods for both nite and innite
numbers of sessions. To the best of our knowledge, no other tool exhibits the
same sope and robustness while enjoying the same performane and salability.
2 The AVISPA Tool
As displayed in Fig.1, the AVISPA Tool is equipped with a web-based graphial
user interfae (www.avispa-projet.org/software) that supports the editing
of protool speiations and allows the user to selet and ongure the dierent
bak-ends of the tool. If an attak on a protool is found, the tool displays it
as a message-sequene hart. For instane, Fig.1 shows part of the speiation
of Siemens' H.530 protool (top-right window) and the attak that AVISPA has
found (bottom window), reported on in [3℄. The interfae features speialized
menus for both novie and expert users. An XEmas mode for editing protool
speiations is available as well.
The AVISPA Tool onsists of independently developed modules, interon-
neted as shown at the bottom left of Fig.1. A protool designer interats with
the tool by speifying a seurity problem (a protool paired with a seurity
property that it is expeted to ahieve) in the High-Level Protool Speia-
tion Language HLPSL [8℄. The HLPSL is an expressive, modular, role-based,
formal language that allows for the speiation of ontrol ow patterns, data-
strutures, alternative intruder models, omplex seurity properties, as well as
dierent ryptographi primitives and their algebrai properties. These features
make HLPSL well suited for speifying modern, industrial-sale protools.
The HLPSL enjoys both a delarative semantis based on a fragment of the
Temporal Logi of Ations [12℄ and an operational semantis based on a trans-
lation into the rewrite-based formalism Intermediate Format IF. HLPSL spei-
ations are translated into equivalent IF speiations by the HLPSL2IF trans-
lator. An IF speiation desribes an innite-state transition system amenable
to formal analysis. IF speiations an be generated both in an untyped variant
and in a typed one, whih abstrats away type-aw attaks (if any) from the
protool; this is partiularly useful as in many ases type-aws an be prevented
in the atual implementation of a protool [11℄. IF speiations are input to the
bak-ends of the AVISPA Tool, whih implement dierent analysis tehniques.
The urrent version of the tool integrates the following four bak-ends.
The On-the-y Model-Cheker (OFMC) [3℄ performs protool falsia-
tion and bounded veriation by exploring the transition system desribed by
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The AVISPA Tool is a suessor to the AVISS Tool [1℄, whih automated the anal-
ysis of seurity protools like those in the Clark/Jaob library. The AVISPA Tool
signiantly extends its predeessor's sope, eetiveness, and performane.
Fig. 1. A sreen-shot of the AVISPA Tool.
an IF speiation in a demand-driven way. OFMC implements a number of or-
ret and omplete symboli tehniques. It supports the speiation of algebrai
properties of ryptographi operators, and typed and untyped protool models.
The Constraint-Logi-based Attak Searher (CL-AtSe) applies on-
straint solving as in [9℄, with some powerful simpliation heuristis and redun-
dany elimination tehniques. CL-AtSe is built in a modular way and is open to
extensions for handling algebrai properties of ryptographi operators. It sup-
ports type-aw detetion and handles assoiativity of message onatenation.
The SAT-based Model-Cheker (SATMC) [2℄ builds a propositional
formula enoding a bounded unrolling of the transition relation speied by the
IF, the initial state and the set of states representing a violation of the seurity
properties. The propositional formula is then fed to a state-of-the-art SAT solver
and any model found is translated bak into an attak.
The TA4SP (Tree Automata based on Automati Approximations
for the Analysis of Seurity Protools) bak-end [5℄ approximates the in-
truder knowledge by using regular tree languages and rewriting. For serey prop-
erties, TA4SP an show whether a protool is awed (by under-approximation)
or whether it is safe for any number of sessions (by over-approximation).
Upon termination, the AVISPA Tool outputs the result of the analysis stating
whether the input problem was solved (positively or negatively), the available
resoures were exhausted, or the problem was not takled for some reason. In
order to demonstrate the eetiveness of the AVISPA Tool on a large olletion
of pratially relevant, industrial protools, we have seleted a substantial set
of seurity problems assoiated with protools that have reently been, or are
urrently being standardized by organizations like the Internet Engineering Task
Fore IETF. We have then formalized in HLPSL a large subset of these protools,
and the result of this speiation eort is the AVISPA Library (publily avail-
able at the AVISPA web-page), whih at present omprises 112 seurity problems
derived from 33 protools. We have thoroughly assessed the AVISPA Tool by
running it against the AVISPA Library. The experimental results are summa-
rized in the appendix. In partiular, the AVISPA Tool has deteted a number
of previously unknown attaks on some of the protools analyzed, e.g. on some
protools of the ISO-PK family, on the IKEv2-DS protool, and on the H.530
protool.
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Appendix: Experimental Results
The following table displays the results of running the AVISPA Tool against
the 112 seurity problems from 33 protools in the AVISPA Library. For eah
of the protools, the table gives the number of seurity problems (#P), and
for eah bak-end, the number of problems suessfully analyzed with the given
resoures
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(P), the number of problems for whih attaks are deteted (A), and
the time (T) spent by the bak-end to nd the attaks or to report that no
attak exists in the given (bounded) senario, where \-" indiates that the bak-
end does not support the analysis of that problem. For SATMC, we list both
the time spent to generate the SAT formula (TE) and that spent to solve the
formula (TS). Note that the times of unsuessful attempts (due to time out
or memory out) are not taken into aount. By running the TA4SP bak-end
Protocol #P P A T P A T P A TE TS
UMTS_AKA 3 3 0 0,02 3 0 0,01 3 0 0,11 0,00
AAAMobileIP 7 7 0 0,75 7 0 0,20 7 0 1,32 0,01
ISO-PK1 1 1 1 0,02 1 1 0,00 1 1 0,05 0,00
ISO-PK2 1 1 0 0,05 1 0 0,00 1 0 1,62 0,00
ISO-PK3 2 2 2 0,04 2 2 0,01 2 2 0,27 0,00
ISO-PK4 2 2 0 0,54 2 0 0,03 2 0 1.153 1,16
LPD-MSR 2 2 2 0,02 2 2 0,02 2 2 0,17 0,02
LPD-IMSR 2 2 0 0,08 2 0 0,01 2 0 0,43 0,01
CHAPv2 3 3 0 0,32 3 0 0,01 3 0 0,55 0,00
EKE 3 3 2 0,19 3 2 0,04 3 2 0,22 0,00
TLS 3 3 0 2,20 3 0 0,32 3 0 - 0,00
DHCP-delayed 2 2 0 0,07 2 0 0,00 2 0 0,19 0,00
Kerb-Cross-Realm 8 8 0 11,86 8 0 4,14 8 0 113,60 1,69
Kerb-Ticket-Cache 6 6 0 2,43 6 0 0,38 6 0 495,66 7,75
Kerb-V 8 8 0 3,08 8 0 0,42 8 0 139,56 2,95
Kerb-Forwardable 6 6 0 30,34 6 0 10,89 0 0 - -
Kerb-PKINIT 7 7 0 4,41 7 0 0,64 7 0 640,33 11,65
Kerb-preauth 7 7 0 1,86 7 0 0,62 7 0 373,72 2,57
CRAM-MD5 2 2 0 0,71 2 0 0,74 2 0 0,40 0,00
PKB 1 1 1 0,25 1 1 0,01 1 1 0,34 0,02
PKB-fix 2 2 0 4,06 2 0 44,25 2 0 0,86 0,02
SRP_siemens 3 3 0 2,86 0 0 - 0 0 - -
EKE2 3 3 0 0,16 0 0 - 0 0 - -
SPEKE 3 3 0 3,11 0 0 - 0 0 - -
IKEv2-CHILD 3 3 0 1,19 0 0 - 0 0 - -
IKEv2-DS 3 3 1 5,22 0 0 - 0 0 - -
IKEv2-DSx 3 3 0 42,56 0 0 - 0 0 - -
IKEv2-MAC 3 3 0 8,03 0 0 - 0 0 - -
IKEv2-MACx 3 3 0 40,54 0 0 - 0 0 - -
h.530 3 1 1 0,64 0 0 - 0 0 - -
h.530-fix 3 3 0 4.278 0 0 - 0 0 - -
lipkey-spkm-known 2 2 0 0,23 0 0 - 0 0 - -
lipkey-spkm-unknown 2 2 0 7,33 0 0 - 0 0 - -
OFMC CL-atse SATMCProblems
on a subset of the AVISPA Library, the AVISPA Tool is able to establish in a
few minutes that a number of protools in the library (namely, EKE, EKE2,
IKEv2-CHILD, IKEv2-MAC, TLS, UMTS AKA, CHAPv2) guarantee serey.
7
Results are obtained by eah single bak-end with a resoure limit of 1 hour CPU
time and 1GB memory, on a Pentium IV 2.4GHz under Linux.
